An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “” key, allowing VNC access via the “” key, and more. ![]() This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the “” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before. This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some debug functions. If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot. On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”. This allows complete control of their desktop, including the ability to inject keystrokes and perform a keylogging attack. In mprivacy-tools before 2.0.406g in m-privacy TightGate-Pro Server, broken Access Control on X11 server sockets allows authenticated attackers (with access to a VNC session) to access the X11 desktops of other users by specifying their DISPLAY ID. ![]() spool directory, and then sending a signal to the VNC service, which automatically transfers them to the connected VNC client's filesystem. In mprivacy-tools before 2.0.406g in m-privacy TightGate-Pro Server, a Directory Traversal in the print function of the VNC service allows authenticated attackers (with access to a VNC session) to automatically transfer malicious PDF documents by moving them into the.
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